PRO0GRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY

DECISO S SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ADMIRALTY.

The rule that where supplies are ordered for a vessel by
the charterer, the materialman is put on inquiry as to the
Maritime
charterer's authority to pledge the ship's credit,
Liens,
and will obtain no lien where he knows, actually
or constructively, that the charterer has no such
Suppies,
Authority
authority, is recognized in the recent case of The
Del Norte, 90 Fed. 5o6. In that case, however, it was held
that the materialman was relieved from the duty of inquiry by
a statute of the state (Wfahington), which made "Masters,
agents, consignees, contractors, sub-contractors, or other
person or persons having charge in whole or in part of the
construction, alteration, repair or equipment of any vessel...
the agent of the owner." As the materialman had no actual
knowledge of the facts, he was allowed to recover, and the
owner was said not to be injured by this result, as he had
protected himself by a "Contract of Guaranty" with the
charterer.
ASSIGNMRNTS FOR CREDITORS.

Following the dictum in Chaffees v. Risk, 24 Ga. 432, and
the decision in Valiance v. Trust Co., 42 Pa. 441, it was held
Assignment in Penn Plate Glass Co. v. Jones, 42 Atl. (Pa.) 189,
to
that an assignment by a debtor to a member of the
Creditor Firm creditor firm, in trust, to pay the firm debt, was
an assignment directly to the creditor which, under the Act of
1843 of Pennsylvania, does not have to be recorded.
BANKRUPTCY.

In re Bates Machine Co., 91 Fed. 625, involved the question
of the right of the directors of a corporation to admit in writing
Admlslon .1 its inability to pay its debts, as a basis of an involInsolvency by untary petition. It was held that such an act was
Directors beyond the authority of the directors and, therefore, not binding on the company, the court intimating a doubt
as to the parallel rule permitting the directors to make an
assignment for the benefit of creditors.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

Another question of first importance urder the new act is
whether the act of bankruptcy described under § 3 as "permitting while insolvent any creditor to obtain a@
Act of
Bankruptcy preference through legal proceedings," requires
any participation on the part of the debtor. Adams, D. J.,
In re Reichnman, 91 Fed. 624, thought not. For an elaborate
discussion of the question see Collier on Bankruptcy, notes

to § 3.
Bray v. Cobb, 91 Fed. 102, decides a number of minor
points under the new law: (I) That a referee is not disqualified
Construction under § 43 by being a debtor of the bankrupt, the
of New Act interest therein mentioned means an interest in the
estate, and a debtor has none; (2) That an assignment for the
benefit of creditors is an act of bankruptcy without regard to
the debtor's assets at the time; (3) That a mere denial of
insolvency in the answer does not sustain the burden of proof
on the defendant and (4) that if defendant desires a jury trial
he must claim it by the date fixed for his answer.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In Dewey v. Des Moines, 19 Sup. Ct. 379, it was alleged
that the amount of a special assessment on city lots was
"greater than the reasonable market value of
Special
Assessments, said lots," and that defendants were seeking
Personalof "to , compel plaintiff to pay the full amount of said
Liability
Non-Resident tax," without regard to the value of the lots.
This allegation was considered not to raise a Federal question, because the point had not been
Proess called to the attention of the state court. But on

Under State
Statute,
Due

a further question, which had been brought up in the state
court, the opinion declares : "The state may provide for the
sale of the property upon which the assessment is laid, but it
cannot, under any guise or pretence, proceed.further and impose a personal liability upon a non-resident to pay the assessment or any part of it." Such imposition is a "taking" of
property "without due process," and so unconstitutional.
This case calls to mind another recent instance of
Eminent
special assessment-Norwoodv. Baker, 172 U. S.
Domain,
8 (Nic
"Front-foot"Ct
Assessment, 269, S. C., i9 Sup. Ct. 187. (Notice how the unIn Excess of official reports have secured promptness in the
issue of those bearing the official imprint. The
Benefit
case was decided December 12, 1898.) Here an assessment
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by the front foot was held a taking of private property for
Dissen i
public use without compensation. Mr. Justice
oP,&. by Brewer's dissent, in which concurred Shiras and
Mr. JustUe White, JJ., employs some language which seems
Brewer
rather remarkable, in view of the learned justice's
distrust of legislatures, as expressed in the grain elevator
cases. Says he (p. 297), "A public improvement having
been made, it is, beyond question, a legislative function . .
to determine the area benefitted by such improvements, and
tke legislative determination is conclusive." (Our italics.)
In Gross v. Kentucky Boardof Managers of Worlds Columian Exposition, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, with two
judges dissenting, have declared that the KenEleventh
Amendment, tuck)? Board of Managers for the Columbian ExContrac
position of 1893, at Chicago, which was endowed
with the power to make contracts by the act c reAga.it a
,st"Berd"ating it, may be sued on any such contract. The
dissenting judges contended that the members of the board
were "agents of the state," and that it was the state's property glone which was to be affected by the suit. Accordingly,
they considered the action as brought virtually against the,
State of Kentucky. The majority proceeded on the theory
that the board, though not named a corporation, and appareqtly not intended as such by the legislature, really was a
quasi-corporate entity, which could sue and be sued, citing Mr.
Justice Brewer's opinion in Hancock v. Rairoad,145 U. S.
409, 12 Sup. Ct. 969 (1892).

The Court of Appeals of New York has decided that a
statu.te (Laws 1889, c. 385) providing that every trade union
Unlawful Dis- adopting a label to designate the products of the
crw,asao. labor of its members m.ay, by fifing a copy of
TrafeL.AbS

such label, obtain the right to enjoin the use,

counterfeit or imitation of same, is not unconstitutional in discriminating in favor of members of unions as against nonunion workmen: Perkins v. Heert, 53 N. E. I8.
CONTRACTS.
In Hall v. Afford, 49 S. W. 444, the Court of Appeals of
reaffirms the rule that in that state a
h of .Kentucky
Stranterto third person may sue on a contract made for his
Consideration benefit between others, to the consideration of
t9 Su.
which he is a stranger.
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

In Olds et al.v. East Tnnessee Stone and _11arble Co. (Court
of Chancery Appeals of Tenn.), 48 S. W. 333, the plaintiff
Offerand
wrote the defendant, a dealer in marble, asking if
Acceptance he could furnish a certain kind of marble at
a certain price; defendant answered by telegraph "Will meet
. . . price . . . Letter to-day's mail." The letter referred to,
stated that the defendant did not care for the contract for the
marble specified in the offer, and offered a different marble-at
a less price, which was refused. In an action on the contract
.alleged to have been consummated by the plaintiff's letter and
.the defendant's telegram, the court held, that the letter sent by
,defendant and referred to in his telegram must be considered,
aand, taken with the telegram, did not consummate a contract;
CORPORATIONS.

Forrester v. Boston, Etc., Mining Co. (Supreme Court of
Montana), 55 Pac. 229, recognizes the right of minority stockholders to restrain the directors of a solvent and
Rights of
Minority
prosperous corporation and the holders of a maStockholders jority of its stock from transferring the corporate
property to another corporation, in consideration of .an exchange of stock or of a certain cash payment to stockholders
unwilling to exchange. So far so good; but, on examination, it appears that the complainants purchased their stock
pe ding the consummation of the transfer, and with notice of
the nature of the proposed transaction. It should seem,
under such circumstances, that they were without equity.
Moreover, one complainant was the solicitor and the other the
vice-president of a rival concern. It is true that the trial
judge found that they were acting in "good faith ;" but they
.seem to have been perilously near the position of the plain:tiff, who was rebuked by Lord Wesbury, in Forrestv. Ry. Co.,
4 DeG. F. & J. 125, as distinguished from the facts of Col.Man v. Eastern Co.'s Ry. Co., io Beav. i, where Lord Lang'dale made a more lenient ruling.
COUNTY BONDS.

In an opinion containing an exhaustive review of authoriities, the Supreme Court of the United States, following ChafRecitals,
fee County v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355, decides that
listoppel
as against a bonafide purchaser of county bonds,
a recital in the bonds that the total amount of the issue does
-not exceed the constitutional limit of indebtedness, taken in
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connection with the fact that the bonds do not shiow upon
their face the amount of the issue. estops the county fi'om disputing the truth of the recital : Board of Commissioncrs of
Gunnison Coun o , v. Rollins, 19 Sup. Ct. 390.
CRIMINAL LAW.

What degree of proof is necessary in order to make out a
defence of insanity was before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Com. v. Wireback, 42 Atl. 542. The
Homicide,
Insanity
defendant had shot and killed a man, and his defence was insanity. It was held, first, that a man is presumed
to be sane until he is proved to be insane, and this can only
be proved by fairly preponderating evidence. Doubt as to
his sanity is not sufficient to overcome the presumption.
Second. a murder, which is otherwise in the first degree, is
not reduced to murder in the second degree by a doubt as to
the sanity of the murderer, as insanity is either a complete
defence or none at all.
The question as to whether a parent who refuses to provide
a physician or medicine for a sick child is guilty of manManslaughter,

slaughter, where the child dies as a consequence

of such refusal, was before the English Court for
Crown Cases Reserved, Queen v. Senior, [ 18991
i Q. B. 283. The parent belonged to a religious
sect who did not believe in medical aid or drugs, but who annointed with oil and prayed for a recovery. A child of the
defendant's was taken sick, and, although the illness was a
grave one, and from which it afterwards died, lie refused to
call in a physician or secure medicine. Every other attention
was paid to the child, and the defendant was a kind and loving
father. The court decided that as a statute made it incumbent upon parents to provide such aid and made it a misdemeanor for those who "wilfully neglect" so to do, the father
was guilty of the crime of manslaughter. The case is a valuable one on account of what falls from Lord Russell at the
end of his opinion: "I wish to add that I dissent entirely
from the view attributed to Piggott, B., in Rcg v. Hines, and
am not satisfied that in the present case there was not sufficient evidence at common law to justify a conviction." This
shows a rational development in this branch of criminal jurisprudence, and is valuable in those states where no statutes
exist on this subject. The view attributed to Piggott, B., was
that in such a case as this there could be no conviction at
common law. (See note in this issue.)
Parent Refusing

to Procure fledicat Aid
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EVIDENCE.

Two Texas cases, M. K. & T. R. R. v. Johnson (S. C. Tex.),
48 S. W. 568, and G. H. & N. R. R. v. Davis (S. C. Tex.),
Resinter Dec. 22, 1898, 48 S.'W. 570, indicate when, in.
Ailos Acta
negligence cases, acts of prior negligence on the
part of the alleged delinquent may be admitted. In the
former case evidence offered that the plaintiff had often slept
on duty, to prove that on this occasion he had been asleep,
was rejected, as the question of negligence was to be determined by the character of the act in question and not by the
character for care and caution of the person performing the act.
In the second case, the competency or incompetency of the
person whose act caused the injury, and his employer's knowledge thereof being in issue, the action being by one servant to
recover for an injury caused by the negligence of another, evidence of prior acts of similar negligence was admitted, they
being frequent enough to show an habitual course of careless
conduct; but evidence that the delinquent was a drinking
man, the rules positively forbidding drinking, was excluded
in the absence of evidence that he was drunk at the time of
the accident. Mere general bad habits in no way contributing
to the accident can, of course, not be shown.
In Hughes v. L. & N. R. R., 48 S. W. 67I, an accident
having occurred to a brakeman on the defendant's train, the
Opinion,
statement made by the conductor at the time of
Res Gestm
the occurence as to the cause of the accident was
excluded, it appearing that he had not seen the accident nor
had any personal knowledge of its cause, his statement expressing merely his opinion thereof.
In Pioneer Savings Bank v. Peck (Ct. Civil Ap. Tex.), 49 S.
W. i6o, the court sustained the exclusion of evidence of the
Conclusions of witness' understanding of the law upon the subLaw
ject of the insolvency of loan and building associations, saying that it was for the court to decide the case
upon its understanding of the law, and that they could dispense with the witness' generosity in stating his legal opinion
on the subject.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Pennsylvania Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430, was the
subject of discussion in Seltzer's Estate, 42 AtI. (Pa.) 289.
Husband's The court easily held that the purpose of that act
Rights in the Was to give the husband the same rights in his
Estate of his wife's estate that she would have had in his if she
Deceased Wife survived him; but that the question whether this
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proportion shall be one-third or one-half depends on whether
the -decedent left any children, and is not affected by the question whether the survivor has children or not.
In spite of the strong disposition of the courts to put the
wife on the same footing as her husband, we still
Wife for
find occasional conservative decisions denying her
Allenting
equal privileges: such is Morgan v. .1artin, 42
Action by

Husband
Atl. (Me.) 354, where the court sustained a demurrer to a declaration setting forth an alienation of a
husband's affections.

Parkerv. Parker,42 Atl. (N. J.) 16o, is a skilful treatment
of an old subject. In New Jersey a wife is entitled to alimony
if her husband has both abandoned and refused to
Abandonment support her.
It was held that his cruel treatment
of her, justifying a departure from his house, was equivalent to
an abandonment by him, and that his altered attitude of reconciliation upon the filing of this bill for alimony, was no defence,
being obviously insincere.
MORTGAGES.

West v. Williams, [1899] 1 Ch. 132, is an important case.
Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. C. 514, has settled that a first
First Mortga- mortgagee, whose mortgage is taken to covet also
gee,
subsequent voluntary advances, cannot claim priSubsequent ority of second mortgage, of which he had notice
Advances

before he made the advances. It was, perhaps,
generally supposed, however, that if the first mortSecond
gagee had covenanted to make the subsequent
mortllgagee
advances, he would be protected as to them; and
it wds so held by Kekewich, J., in the lower court, [1898] I
Ch. 488. His decision is, however, now reversed by the Court
of Appeal, on the ground that the tacit agreement of every
such mortgage is that the advances are to be made only if the
security has not been impaired; and, if it has been impaired
by a second mortgage, the first mortgagee should not make
the additional advances.
Rhfv'

Against

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The constitutional provision that "The compensation of any
city, county, town, or municipal officer, shall not be changed
after his election or appointment, or during his
Officers,
Law,
Term of office," t'as held by the Court of Appeals
Reducilon of of Kentucky to apply only to the salary of officers
Compensation having .- fixed term, arid not to the salary of a
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policeman who, under the statutes, was removable at pleasure,
with or without cause. City of Lexington v. Rennick, 49 S. W.
787.
In People ex. rel. Labaugh v. Board of Education, 52 N. E.
850, the Supreme Court of Illinois declares that, where smallpox does not exist and there is no reasonable
Schools,
Compulsory cause to apprehend its appearance, a rulb adopted
Vaccination of by the State Board of Health compelling the
Pupils
vaccination of children as a pre-requisite to.
attendance in the public schools, is unreasonable and void.
NEGLIGENCE.

In Aslen v. Village of Charlotte (Supreme Court, App. Div.)
54 N. Y. Suppl. 754, which was an action against the muniRepair of
cipality to recover for injuries received from a
Sidewalk,
defective sidewalk, it appeared that the stringers
Negligence holding the boards on the sidewalk were so badly
decayed as not to securely hold nails driven into them
through the planks. Witnesses for the plaintiff testified that
for some time previous to the accident they had observed thedefects in the walk, while defendant's witnesses, who had been
over the walk, testified that they had not discovered its defective condition. Held (i), that the evidence warranted a.
finding that the defect had existed for such a length of time
as to attract the attention of the municipality, and that its
omission to repair same was negligence; (2) that the defect
was not so inconsiderable as not to be discovered by the exercise of such reasonable care as the municipality was bound to
maintain.
In Williams v. Hays, 52 N. E. 589, the Court of Appeals
of New York had this state of facts before them. The captain
Lossofv,,,,, of a brig, after working hard to save it from
Negligence of a storm, became exhausted. Tugs passing offered
Officers,
him assistance, which he declined, and he seemed
Insanity
dazed and made irresponsive answers to questions.
The brig was unmanageable and drifted upon the beach.
This action was against the master for the negligent destruction of the vessel. Held, that if the master was suffering
from temporary insanity, resulting from exhaustion caused by
his efforts to save the brig, he was not liable.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Green v. Ashland
Water Co., 77 N. W. 722, decided that where a water com-
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pany's source of supply was contaminated by
sewage for a long time, several years, and the
Liability for fact that it annually caused epidemics of typhoid
Furnishing fever was a matter of common knowledge, the
fpure Water presumption is that the members of such comWater
Comipany's

munity of ordinary intelligence have notice of the situation,
and in the absence of contrary evidence, this will preclude a
recovery by a person injured by the use of such water, because
of his contributory fault.
The sewage of a city was drained into a bay, and it was
from this bay that the company took its water. The water of
the bay had been polluted for years, all of which the plaintiff
knew, and as he was an intelligent, reading, workingman,
taking one of the city's papers, where the dangers of taking
water from the bay was discussed, he must be taken to have
-contributed to the injury which resulted from his having
typhoid fever.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Choses in action cannot 'e levied upon and sold under a
Executon fierifacias. Therefore an alleged sale, under such
an execution, of the right, title and interest of the
Against
Chofts in
defendant in and to a policy of insurance, passed
Action
no title : Building and Loan Ass'n v. Moaker, 9 Pa.
Sup. 340.
The exceptions to this are quite numerous in Pennsylvania.
See the opinion of Mitchell, J., in Farnsworthv. Flagg, 12 W.
Note that
N. C. 5o0 (though his instance of a patent seems to
"The common law reason for
there are Ex- (LS not correct).
ceptions in
this is a technical one, i. e., the incapability of
Pennsylvania manual seizure and delivery by the sheriff. In
Pennsylvania the office and operation of a ft. fa. have been
much enlarged," and examples are give6-as the levy upon
land, the sale of a corporate franchise under the Act of April
7, i87o. To these may-be added the sale of an interest in a
partnership.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has reaffirmed the rule
that the courts of a state where a mortal wound was inflicted
Jusdiction have jurisdiction, though the deceased died in
InCases of another state: State v. Garrison, 49 S. W. 507.
rlutder
(For a discussion of this question see United States
v. Guitean, i Mackey, Sup. Ct. Dist. o" Columbia, p. 48.)
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The following interesting points were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in February last, upon
Attachment appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of
Against
Oklahoma: (I) Where the ground of an attachNon-Resident
of Territory, ment may be alleged in the language of the statAuthority to ute, the authority to allow the writ need not
be
Issue Ministerial. not exercised by the judge of the court, but may be
Judicial
delegated by the legislature to an official, suih as
the clerk of the court. (This recalls the Pennsylvania "Attachment under the Act of 1869." See Amended Act of
May 24, 1887, P. L. 197.)
(2) The section of the organic act of the territory requires
that all civil actions shall be brought in. the county where a
Jurisdiction defendant resides or can be found.
It was conby Proceeding tended that under this act .the court could not
in Rem
acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendant by constructive service, by foreign attachment. Held,
that in a proceeding by attachment of property, which is in
the nature of an action in ren, it is elementary that the defendant is found, to the extent of the property levied upon,
where the property is attached.
(3)The requirement of the territorial statute that the plaintiff give bond as a pre-requisite to the issuance of an attachRequirement ment against a resident, but requires no bond
of Bond in where the attachment is against the property of a
Case of Resn.
dentand not non-resident, is not inconflict with the Fourteenth
InCase of Non- Amendment to the Constitution of the United
Resident Is States, or with the Civil Rights Act. The disNot a Denial
of Due Pro. tinction between a resident and a non-resident is
cess of Law. so broad as to authorize a classification.
The
or of the
Equal Protec- power to grant the remedy in one case and to
tlon of the deny it in the other embraces the right to impose
Laws
upon the one a condition not required in the
other: Central Co. v. Campbell Co., 19 Sup. Ct. 346.
When appellant dies after argument, but before decision,
judgment will be entered before his death (Sup. Court of Cal.):
Death of
Ede v. Cuneo, 55 Pac. 772. This practice calls to
Appellant
mind the rule in Pennsylvania founded upon
before
legislation in England. In Chase v. Hodges, 2
Decision
Pa. 48. Burnside, J., said:
"The statute of 17
Charles II, chap. 8, made perpetual by I James II, chap.
17, sect. 5, enacts that, when either party dies between verdict and judgment, the death shall not be alleged for error,
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so tlt the jud;,-nt L! h.ad %%ithin t%o terms after verdfict.'
It was, therefure, decided that the death of the defendant
between verdict and judgment (if not more than two terms
intervened) could not be assigned for error. And in 11"ooad v.
Boyle, I77 Pa. 621, the like ruling was made in the case of
the death of the plaintiff after verdict before the entry of
judgment.
In 38 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (N. S.) 56, there was a
reference to the decision of the Supreme Court of PennsylMasters in vania in iddlcton v. Middleton, 41 Atl. 29 1, upon
Divorce
the invalidity of appointments of masters in divorce. By an Act of Assembly, approved March To, 1899,
the Courts of Common Pleas are empowered to " appoint
masters in divorce proceedings, and to adopt rules to regulate
the proceedings before the master and fixing his fees." This
will, doubtless, have the effect of restoring the recent practice
in Philadelphia.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The limitations of a wife's right to bind her husband as his
agent are shown in Detwiler v. Bdwer, 9 Pa. Super. 473. AdHusband and mitting that a husband is liable for necessaries for
Wife,
his family ordered by his wife, the court nevertheWife'sAgency less held that, though medicines are necessaries,

an expensive surgical operation is not-or at least that plaintiff
should not have prrmed it without the knowledge and
consent of the child s father.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

In Caf'ital Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Gain's, 49 S. XV. 462,
the Cdi'rt of Appeals of Kentucky cited with approval the lanMA1.tae of
guage of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in
Law,
Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 554, where it was
Voluntary said: "We mean distinctly to assert that when
Payment,
money is paid by one under a mistake of his rights
Recover
and duty, and which he was under no legal or
moral obligation to pay, and which the recipient has no right
in good conscience to retain, it may be recovered back,
whether such mistake be one of fact or law; and this, we
insist, may be done both upon the principle of Christian
morals and the common law"; and decides that money paid
to a gas company as meter rent under a mistake of law may
be recovered, though the payment was vohntary.
Rlght to
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REAL PROPERTY.

An interesting state of facts raised the question of the
extent of the easement of the public in land taken for a highFee of Land way, in Huffman v. State, 52 N. E. 713 (Ind.). It.
Under
there appeared that A's land was bounded by a
Highway
highway, under which the B natural gas company
had laid a pipe on the side of the road next A's land. The
company afterwards sent 'men to take up this pipe, and A
ordered them to desist from digging it up, alleging ihat they.
were guilty of a trespass on his land. In a prosecution of the
servants of B for trespass, the court recognized the principle
that the title to the land was in A to the middle of the highway. subject to the easement of the public, but held that the
easement did not extend to the laying of pipes for natural gas,
and sustained a conviction for trespass. The decision followed
Consumer's Gas Co. v. Hzuntsinger, 14 Ind. App. 156, where it
was held that the building of a pipe-line for gas along a highway is an additional burden upon the fee, for which compensation must be made to the owner. By statute in Indiana, it
is made unlawful for a company to lay such a line without the
consent of the abutting owner. It has been held that the
owner of the fee may have an action of trespass or ejectment
against any one who cannot justify his right to the use of the
highway under the owner of the easement: Cooper v. Smith,
9 Serg. & R. 26; Alden v. Murdock; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9
Ia. 450; Locks v. Nashua & Lowell R. R., 104 Mass. i.
SALES.

A sold a tract of land to B, agreeing to accept bank stock
in payment. Subsequently, the bank having gone into the
Vendor'sLien, hands of a receiver, A filed a bill alleging that he
Fraud of
had been induced to accept the stock through
Vendee
misrepresentations as to the value thereof, and
praying for a vendor's lien, for the. deficiency arising from the
failure of the stock, to equal its represented value. Held, that
A could not affirm the contract and maintain a lien for the
deficiency, but that his remedy was by rescission or at law
by an action for damages for the fraud: Graham v. Moffett
(Supreme Court of Michigan), 78 N. W. 132.
In McKenzie v. Rothschild, 24 South. 716, the Supreme
Court of Alabama reasserts the rule laid down by the same
Fraud,
court in M4axwell v. Shore Company, 21 South.
Rescission
ioo9, that "a sale and purchase of goods is fraudulent and open to disaffirmance by the seller when the pur-
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chaser was, at the time thereof, insolvent, or in failing circumstances, and had the design not to pay for them, or had no
reasonable expectation of being able to -pay for them, and
either represented that he was solvent or intended to pay, or
had reasonable expectation of being able to pay, or failed to
disclose his financial condition, or the fact that he did not intend to pay, or expect to be able to pay, for the goods."
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

A contractor, who had undertaken to build a house for B,
became insolvent, and A, a sub-contractor, threatening to quit
Froinseto work, B told him to continue his work and that
In an action on
Pay Debt of he would see that he was paid.
Another
this promise by A against B held, that it was not
a promise to pay the debt of another within the statute of
frauds: Hall v. Afford, 49 S.W. 444 (Court of Appeals of
Kentucky).
STATUTES.

In HenriettaMining & Milling Co. v. Gardner, i9 Sup. Ct.
327, the Supreme Court of the United States reiterates the rule
Adolflonfrom that a paragraph adopted by a territorial legislaAnother State ture from the code of another state is presumed to
be taken, with the meaning it had in that state.
SURETYSHIP.

First Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 32 S. E. (W. Va.) 271, is a
nice example of when a surety will, or rather will not, be discharged by the creditor's conduct. It was held
Surety,
Discharze by that he was not discharged either by the creditor's
Creditor's
releasing an attachment against real estate because
Conduct
it was encumbered beyond its full value, or by the
continuance of a suit against t'he defendant for a term. The
underlying condition of the suiety' right in each case is correctly stated to be that a surety canfiot be discharged by any
act which does not impair his rights "or affect the crediior's
remedy.
TRADE-NAME.

An important decision- on the right to the exclusive use of
a geographical name as a trade-name has been made by the
I .Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in
Appropriation American Waltham Wtikh Co. v. United States
of

Geographical
Name,
Inju-cton

Watck Co., 53 N. E. 141. The question raised
at the hearing Was whether the defendant should
be enjoined against using the Words "Walt:ham"
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or "Waltham, Mass.," upon plates of its watches without some
accompanying statement which should clearly distinguish its
watches from those made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
the first manufacturer of watches in Waltham, and had acquired
a great reputation before the defendant began to do business
in the same town, and it was found that the word "Waltham"
which originally had been used by the plaintiff in. a merely
geographical sense had, by long use, come to have a secondary
meaning as a designation of the watches which the public had
become accustomed to associate with the name, and that the
defendant used the name to deceitfully divert custom from the
plaintiff. The defendant contended that whatever its intent,
it had a right to put its name and address upon its watches,
and to require it to add words which would distinguish its
watches from the plaintiff's would discredit them in advance.
The court, acknowledging the abstract difficulties involved in
the question, made a decree for the plaintiff.
The English House of Lords has affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeal in Manchester Brewing Company v, North
Similarity of Cheshire and Manchester Brewing Company,
Names,
[1898], I Ch. 539, noted in 37 AM. LAW REG. 572.
Injunction The court held that the Manchester Brewing Company-an old and well-known firm-could enjoin the use, by
a new company, of the name, "North Cheshire and Manchester Brewing Company," although there might not have
been intention to deceive: North Cheshire and Manchester
Brewing- Company v.- Manchester Brewing Conpany, [1899]
A. C. 83.
TRUSTS.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has decided, in Dickson
v. Barker,77 N.W. 820, that a promissory note given on considContract to eration that a trustee joins the maker with him in a
Become
trust, is given on an illegal consideration and void,
Trustee
even though the note is made payable to the cestui
que trust,the cestuibeing ignorant of the transaction. In this case
one of the directors of a savings association agreed to elect
the maker of the note a director. The note was made payable to the company. Under the laws of Minnesota a savings
association has no capital stock, and is to be managed exclusively in the interest of the depositors. After the vote was
given and the payee elected a director, the company made an
assignment. The receiver was plaintiff on the note.

